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CHINA’S XINJIANG POLICY: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON THE THEORY OF 
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 
 
Xinjiang, which is China’s western province that comprised 18 percent of the 
country’s total land area and heavily populated by non-Han Chinese ethnic 
minorities, is a region increasingly beset by the problem of confrontation between 
two very distinct groups- the more recently arrived Han and the indigenous 
Uighur Turkish Muslims. The confrontation revolves primarily around the 
struggle for domination over the province between the two, and also Uighur quest 
for greater autonomy rights or even independence from the government of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In order to tackle these problems, the 
government of CCP has already taken and implemented both coercive and 
persuasive measures and policies in Xinjiang since the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949. However, disturbances by ethnic minorities 
in Xinjiang such as violent demonstrations and ethnic clashes continue and can 
recur anytime in the future with little forewarning if necessary steps were not 
taken. All these, reflect the failure of CCP government’s policies towards 
Xinjiang in its efforts to ensure stability in the region. To what extend the 
effectiveness of CCP’s policies towards Xinjiang depends on the factor of relative 
deprivation (RD) that exist among the minorities in Xinjiang, particularly the 
Uighurs when they compare themselves with their Han counterparts that 
obviously have better living conditions compared to them. 
 
 
Keywords: Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), ethnic minority, relative 
deprivation, resentment, separatism, terrorism, ethnic conflict, East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM)  
 
 
Introduction 
Beijing has already implemented both coercive and persuasive measures and 
policies in Xinjiang in order to curb the problems of Uighur separatism as well as ethnic 
confrontation between the Uighurs and the Hans in the region. However, disturbances by 
ethnic minorities such as violent demonstrations continue to occur and these disturbances 
have in fact turned more serious in terms of their magnitude, where they became 
increasingly violent and caused higher property as well as human losses in recent years. 
Thus, one may ask, despite all the strategies taken by the Chinese Government in order to 
restore peace and stability in Xinjiang, why the situation in Xinjiang not only did not get 
any better but has in fact became worse?  
In this article, I examine this question both theoretically and empirically. 
Theoretically, I have identify an interesting explanation that would better explain the 
failure of Beijing’s Xinjiang policy since 1949 based on the theory of Relative 
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Deprivation, and hypothesize that there are five factors that lead to the feeling of relative 
deprivation among the Uighurs in Xinjiang that eventually cause failure in the policy. 
These factors include historical memory of the Uighurs, Uighurs’ instinct to preserve 
their identity and PRC’s insensitivity towards local Muslim sentiments, mass influx of 
Han Chinese into Xinjiang, as well as Xinjiang’s increasing exposure to the Islamic 
world. These hypotheses are different from Beijing’s opinion that the resentment among 
its Xinjiang minorities is caused by the problem of poverty. Empirically, I have also 
examine Beijing’s Xinjiang policy since the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1949 and how these policies have shifted through time and event.  
This article is divided into three sections. I first lay out PRC’s policy in Xinjiang 
from the period of 1949 until 2009. This section also shows how the policy changes over 
time as well as the internal and external factors that facilitated those changes. In the next 
section, I then introduce my theoretical framework and my explanation about the main 
question of this study. The conclusion considers that some of these new interpretations 
might be able to offer some solutions to the ‘Xinjiang Problem’ and suggest changes in 
how Chinese scholars and policymakers should look at the issue today and in the future 
in order to restore peace and stability in the region. 
 
 
China’s Policy towards Xinjiang 
The discussion about China’s Xinjiang policy will be divided to four phases and 
will be discussed accordingly. The first phase will discuss about China’s policy in 
Xinjiang for the period between 1949-1976, while the second phase will discuss Beijing’s 
policy in Xinjiang for the time period of 1977-1990. This is followed by the third phase 
that will discuss about Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang from 1991-2000. Lastly, the fourth 
phase will discuss about China’s Xinjiang policy for year 2001-2009. 
 
 
The First Phase: 1949-1976 
In the end of 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had successfully taken 
control over Xinjiang and China from Guomindang (GMD) after the long 22 years of 
civil war. In 1st
In 1
 October 1949, Mao Zedong has announced the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) with its capital in Beijing. During this period of time, 
it is important for Beijing to strengthen its territorial integrity by monitoring and reducing 
the separatist tendencies among the population in Xinjiang that share a strong ethnic ties 
with population in Soviet Union’s territories in Central Asia. Therefore, to achieve this 
goal, Beijing in the early stage of the establishment of the PRC has taken a more tolerant 
policy towards Xinjiang in order to further integrate Xinjiang into the PRC. 
st October 1955, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region was officially 
established.1
                                                             
1 Michael Dillon, “Ethnic, Religious and Political Conflict on China’s Northwestern Border: The 
Background to the Violence in Xinjiang,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (Spring 1997), p. 81. 
 The establishment of XUAR with the ‘autonomous’ status means that the 
population in Xinjiang is supposed to have their rights to rule the province although their 
‘autonomous’ rights have been limited by Beijing. However, The CCP’s tongyi zhanxian 
(united front) policy counseled the establishment of links with ‘progressive members’ of 
social and religious elites, which involved only minimal interference in business, 
China’s Xinjiang Policy: An Analysis Based on the Theory of Relative Deprivation 
Jebat  Volume 38 (2011) Page | 149  
religious practice, or social norms in Xinjiang.2 The party did, however, slowly take 
control over religious institutions in Xinjiang through the China Islamic Association, as 
well as the confiscation of mosque lands and forcible replacement of religious courts with 
‘People’s Courts’.3
 In order to control the situation in Xinjiang, Beijing has also established the 
Production and Construction Corps (PCC) that is also known as the shengchan jianshe 
bingtuan in 1954. Though the PCC was initially billed as a force to protect China’s 
sovereignty in its sensitive border regions, the pattern of deployment of its units makes it 
clear that defense against foreign invasions was not Beijing’s main concern.
 
4 In fact, the 
main concern of the CCP and the rationale behind its deployment in Xinjiang is to control 
and prevent the problem of separatism among the minority population in Xinjiang in their 
quest to form their own state.5 This can be seen through the high concentration of PCC 
units in areas such as Aksu, Kashgar and Qumul that has high Uighur population.6 Even 
though the PCC is heavily dominated by the Han Chinese, but there is also a small 
amount of minority Chinese in the body. This is very important to ensure that if the 
Uighurs were to seek independence from Beijing through both violence and non-violence 
means in the future, their quest will not only be opposed by over 7 million Hans, but also 
by another 2 million of other minorities in PCC such as the Mongol, Xibo and Turkic.7
 However, this relatively tolerant policy towards Xinjiang was replaced with a 
more assimilationist policy when Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward Plan in 
1958. This radical collectivization and industrialization drive was accompanied by a more 
assimilationist cultural thrust, political attacks on Xinjiang natives associated with Soviet 
Union and an upsurge in Han immigration and settlement in northern Xinjiang.
 
8
During this period of time, state sponsored Han immigration into Xinjiang is 
already an important component in Beijing’s policy towards Xinjiang. Not long after the 
establishment of the PRC, Beijing has come up with a plan to move approximately two 
million Han Chinese from other provinces in China into Xinjiang.
 For this 
plan, ethnicity has been seen as an obstacle for the development of the country. Thus, at 
that time, Islam and other minority’s customs were regarded as backward customs and 
were condemned by the Chinese government. As a result, Xinjiang as a part of China also 
had to go through a forcible cultural homogenization.  
9 However, the plan 
was over-fulfilled. Between 1950 and 1978, there were roughly around three million 
Hans that had moved into Xinjiang.10
                                                             
2 Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” 
Policy Studies 11 (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004), p. 18. 
3 Donald H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977 (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1979), pp. 113-114. 
4 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” pp. 26-27. 
5 Abanti Bhattacharya, “Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” Strategic Analysis, 
Vol. 27, No. 3 (July-September 2003), p. 367. 
6 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 26. 
7 Ibid., p. 28. 
8 James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment (Washington, DC: East-West 
Center Washington, 2004), p. 6. 
9 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” pp. 23-24. 
10 Ibid., p. 24. 
 As a result, the population of Han Chinese 
immigrant in Xinjiang has increased from nearly 300,000 people in 1953 to nearly six 
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million people in 1990, in addition to more than one and a half million demobilized Han 
soldiers in PCC.11 This phenomenon is also influenced by the impact of the famine 
caused by the Great Leap Forward where between 1959-1950, around 800,000 Han 
Chinese from all over China have migrated to Xinjiang.12 According of the 2000 census, 
Han Chinese has made up 41 percent of Xinjiang’s total population, where their presence 
not only has created strong competition for the Uighurs in terms of Xinjiang land and 
resources, but has also asserted a strong language pressure on minority languages and 
cultures in the region.13
With the end of the Cultural Revolution after Mao’s death in 1976, Chinese 
leaders and policy makers came to face a crisis. The Cultural Revolution has provoked 
resentment among many of its citizens, especially among the non-Hans. For Uighurs in 
Xinjiang, the Cultural Revolution was not only merely a social and political assault, but it 
was also an attack on their unique identity.
 
 A return to a more liberal and moderate policy towards Xinjiang can be spotted in 
early 1960s but this policy was then reversed again with the event of Cultural Revolution 
in 1966. During the era of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), non-Han cultures were again 
been seen the symbol of underdevelopment. Beijing’s policy towards Xinjiang and its 
non-Han population was the most assimilationist and intolerant during the era of Cultural 
Revolution.   
 
 
The Second Phase: 1977-1990 
14
When Deng Xiaoping came into power in 1978-1979, he has announced an 
economic reformation in China and has practiced a more tolerant economic, cultural and 
religious policy in Xinjiang. He has also introduced China with a new era by announcing 
a new openness for intellectual exploration. In Xinjiang, Uighur writers such as Turghun 
Almas had produced multiple writings about the history of Uighurs who had once formed 
their own state. However, this situation changed after series of student protests along 
1980s, the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the 1990 Baren Incident. Since then, Beijing has 
tightened its control over the matter of publication in Xinjiang where Uighur writings 
will be censored over and over again before publishing and many were banned for fear 
that they will revive Uighurs quest for independence. In 2002, the Chinese government 
 The Chinese policy makers realized that the 
continuation of a hardline policy will further increase discontent among the Uighurs. 
Therefore, they have decided to use the combination of both persuasive and coercive 
elements in their policy towards Xinjiang, through the loosening of economic policy with 
the tightening of political policy, which is a combination that has been used until today. 
Their decision was also influenced by the deterioration in Sino-Russia relations between 
1960-1977 that has a negative impact on China’s economy. As a result, economic 
recovery has become the main priority in Beijing’s policy in this period of time. 
                                                             
11 Arienne M. Dwyer, “The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse,” 
Policy Studies 15 (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2005), p. 4. 
12 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 19. 
13 Dwyer, “The Xinjiang Conflict,” p. 4. 
14 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 21. 
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even openly burned ‘illegal’ books and writings that still exist.15 Besides, Uighurs’ 
writings, audio tapes of poetry and music were also banned for bringing ‘unhealthy social 
effects’.16 In addition, outspoken individuals and those who were involved in major 
demonstration or those suspected of harboring separatist ideas were also sent to jail for a 
period of time, mostly without formal charges.17
 In order to control the population growth among the minorities in Xinjiang, 
Beijing has also decided to extend its national family planning policy to include to non-
Han minorities in Xinjiang. Since then, Uighurs in urban area were limited to only two 
children per household, while those who live in rural area were allowed to have three 
children although there are a few exceptions.
 
18 This policy was opposed by the Uighurs. 
However, this limitation towards its minorities was followed by a preferential policy also 
known as youhui zhengce. This policy allow lower admittance scores on the national 
university entrance examinations for the Uighurs and allow some Uighur couples to have 
two or three children.19 Uighurs can also find jobs in state-owned enterprises with lower 
qualifications and join government bodies more easily than their Han counterparts in 
Xinjiang.20 The Chinese government has also invested heavily in infrastructure and social 
development projects in southern Xinjiang where the Uighurs are the majority among the 
local residents.21 These policies have unquestionably contributed to the emergence of 
Uyghur working and professional classes but many Uighurs still feel that they have been 
downgraded to strangers in their own land, where they are now dependent on Han 
governors for policy handouts and Han employers for jobs.22
 In terms of religion, the CCP did loosen control of religion in Xinjiang in the 
early 1980s after the end of the Cultural Revolution. One obvious sign of this was the 
massive rebuilding of mosques in the region. When Deng Xiaoping took over the 
leadership, his relatively more tolerant policies has led to the rebuilt of over 2/3 of the 
original mosques operating in the area before 1966 and by 1981, there were around 4,700 
mosques in Kashgar District and 93 in Kashgar City alone.
 
23 Mosque construction 
continued throughout 1980s and by the mid-1980s, Muslims in Xinjiang had more 
mosques per capita than their co-religious anywhere in the world, with a ratio of one 
mosque for every 150 people.24
                                                             
15 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Dubious Role in the War on Terror,” Current History, Vol. 102, No. 668 
(December 2003), p. 432. 
16 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 31. 
17 Dru Gladney, “Xinjiang: China’s Future West Bank?,” Current History, Vol. 101, No. 656 (September 
2002), p. 267. 
18 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 26. 
19 David Wang, “East Turkestan Movement in Xinjiang,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 
1 (June 1998), p. 8 
20 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 37. 
21 Wang, “East Turkestan Movement in Xinjiang,” p. 8. 
22 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 37. 
23 Ibid.  
24 J. Peter Pham, “Beijing’s Great Game: Understanding Chinese Strategy in Central Eurasia,” American 
Foreign Policy Interests, No. 28 (2006), p. 56. 
 
 
 
Third Phase: 1991-2000 
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The collapse of Soviet Union in 1990 had no doubt eliminated Beijing’s fear 
against Soviet’s influence and threat to Xinjiang, but it also posed new challenges for 
Beijing- uncertainty in dealing with five new Central Asian republics and the problem of 
regional Islamic revival. Thus, China has established The Shanghai Five in 1996 with 
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as member states. The 
organization then changed its name to Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after 
Uzbekistan joined the group in 2001.25 The main objective of this organization is to 
neutralize the Uighurs quest for support from the Central Asian republics by expressing 
its concerns about the rise of religious fundamentalism, terrorism and separatism. In 
return, China has provided these Central Asian republics with massive loans and other 
forms of aid such as by supporting their actions against their own internal challenges.26
 During this period of time, the Chinese government also thinks that poverty 
breeds discontent among the minorities in Xinjiang. Therefore, economic development in 
Xinjiang was given priority by the Chinese government during this time. Beijing’s 
strategy of economic development in Xinjiang emphasizes equally on both cross-border 
as well as domestic trade and investment for the region.
 
27 Thus, in early 1990s, the 
government had announced its ‘West-leaning’ policies which involved favorable land 
lease rates and tax abatements in its western hinterlands in order to lure labor as well as 
capital to its western regions.28 As a result, we can see thousands and thousands of Han 
Chinese all over China poured into Xinjiang in search of jobs and wealth in the ‘Great 
Northwest’. However, there has been a scarcity of the most desirable kinds of immigrant 
to Xinjiang such as educated youths, technical workers and reliable cadres.29
Therefore in June 1999, Beijing has launched its ‘Go West’ policy (xibu da kaifa) 
which allocated a large sum of capital and resources for the purpose of infrastructural 
development in Xinjiang and other western provinces in order to attract all kinds of Han 
immigrants to its western region.
  
30 Beijing furthered its development strategy in its 
western region through the ‘Prosperous Border Rich People’ (xingbian fumin) policy 
announced in 2000, which is a part of the ‘Go West’ policy that mandated the 
government to spend 60 percent of its total capital investment in its western region.31 
Through this policy, Beijing hopes to create an ethnic merchant middle-class that will 
tolerate any instability in the region even though they are not pro-Chinese.32 Beijing also 
regularly provided Xinjiang with enormous subsidies which amounted to almost half of 
annual government expenditures.33 For example, Xinjiang received nearly 12 billion yuan 
of subsidies from Beijing in 2000.34
                                                             
25 Ramakant Dwivedi, “China’s Cental Asia Policy in Recent Times,” China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly, Vol. 4, No.4 (2006), p. 142. 
26 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 23. 
27 Chung Chien-Peng, “Confronting Terrorism and Other Evils in China: All Quiet on the Western Front?,” 
China and  Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006), p. 79. 
28 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 25. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Bhattacharya, “Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” p. 369. 
31 Chung, “Confronting Terrorism and Other Evils in China,” pp. 79-80. 
32 Ibid., p. 80. 
33 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 38. 
34 Ibid. 
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 Although economic development in Xinjiang was given priority by the Chinese 
government, but all kinds of violent events that happened along 1990s had forced Beijing 
to undertake a more repressive political policy towards the region. One example of these 
violent events is the February 5, 1992 Urumqi Bus Bombing where three civilians were 
killed and 23 other were injured in two bus explosions.35 There are two major 
components in Beijing’s political tightening in Xinjiang. First, is the yearly ‘Strike Hard’ 
(yan da) campaign aim to combat violent property crimes, drug problems as well as 
political crimes.36 The second component is the ‘Comprehensive Management’ (zonghe 
zhili) which refers to periodic sweeps arranged by Public Security personnel to shore up 
control in each locality.37
 Beijing was swift in grabbing the opportunity by linking an Uighur separatist 
group called East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) based in Xinjiang with al-Qaeda 
and Taliban and has successfully placed the Uighur’s fight for independence in the 
context of international terrorism even though ETIM’s relations with al-Qaeda and 
Taliban are yet to be proven. Beijing has offered Washington its support in the WOT to 
combat international terrorism. Its support for WOT can be seen through its support for 
the coalition forces to invade Afghanistan as long as the attack will not target any 
innocent civilians.
 
 
 
Fourth Phase: 2001-2009 
The terrorist attack in Washington D.C, Pennsylvania and New York on 11 
September 2001 has changed United States’ threat perception and also its national 
security strategy. These can be seen through the anti-terrorist campaigns launched by the 
U.S such as the War on Terrorism (WOT) to combat the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda as 
well as the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. The 9/11 tragedy has 
also provided an opportunity to other nations in the international system to link their 
domestic problems with WOT that will allow them to use wider range of tactics without 
the fear of condemnation from the international community. 
38 In addition, Beijing has also agreed to share information about 
Taliban and al-Qaeda with Washington and play an important diplomatic role in 
convincing Pervez Musharraf’s government to support war against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan.39 Besides, Beijing has also monitored suspected terrorists bank accounts in 
both Hong Kong and mainland China and closed its border with Afghanistan to avoid 
Taliban’s fighters from entering Xinjiang.40
 The international community has heavily condemned China for its actions in 
Xinjiang including the executions of separatists and its suppression of religious practices 
in the region. However, these criticism have softened after the 9/11 bombing. As a result, 
the condition in Xinjiang has become worse after the event of 9/11. In late 2002, Beijing 
 Following its support for the WOT, Beijing 
was also quick in modifying its strategy and policy in Xinjiang.  
                                                             
35 Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, p. 15. 
36 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 22. 
37 Ibid. 
38 David Shambaugh, “Sino-American Relations since September 11: Can the New Stability Last?,” 
Current History, Vol. 101, No. 656 (September 2002), pp. 243-244. 
39 Ibid., p. 244. 
40 Ibid. 
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has expanded its definition of terrorism to include those who have ‘separatist thoughts’.41
Beijing has also urged Washington to support and cooperate with the Chinese 
government in its effort to combat Uighur ‘terrorists’ in Xinjiang. China’s Minister of 
Public Security at that time, Zhou Yongkang has also tried to convince the U.S 
ambassador to Beijing, Clark Randt to support Beijing’s efforts in combatting Uighur 
‘terrorists’ through a more organized cooperation between the two governments.
 
Beijing unspecific and general definition about terrorism has indirectly allows Beijing to 
arrest and execute any suspected individual as it wish.  
42 
Beijing also sought support from the Central Asian republics for its fight against the 
Uighur ‘terrorists’ in Xinjiang through SCO and other economic means. This is very 
important because the Uighur liberation struggle has gained popular support from the 
population of these republics.43 But the governments on the contrary are supportive of 
Beijing fight against Islamic radicalism, terrorism and separatism by cooperating with 
Beijing to suppress cross-border terrorism and separatism for the sake of their economic 
interests with China.44
 Following the event of 9/11 terrorist attack, Beijing has also further restricted the 
religious rights of Muslim population in Xinjiang including the banning of some religious 
practices during the holy month of Ramadan, increasing control over the Islamic clergy 
and also closure of mosques in the region.
 
45 There was also heavy People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) presence in the region that created fear among the Uighurs to interact with 
foreigners.46 The Chinese security forces in Xinjiang also constantly check the 
identification of the Uighurs in Xinjiang and those who fail to show their identity card 
will be arrested immediately.47
China’s decision to intensify its pressure on Xinjiang as a whole was not merely 
caused by the opportunity offered by the WOT, but also the event of political change in 
Central Asia. In March 2005, an incident called the Tulip Revolution has occurred in 
Kyrgyzstan and has successfully overthrown the leadership of President Askar Akayev 
who has ruled the country since its independence.
  
48
In the field of political science, RD has been seen as a factor which can lead to a 
revolution and usually appears when a dominant community has advantages on a 
 Since early 1990s, Beijing has 
constantly inserted its influence onto Askar Akayev administration to control the Uighurs 
in Kyrgyzstan tightly. Through the Tulip Revolution and the fall of Askar Akayev, 
Beijing was worried that Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan will now have more freedom to seek 
independence in that country and encourage Uighurs in Xinjiang to do the same.  
 
 
An Analysis Based on the Theory of Relative Deprivation 
                                                             
41 Joshua Kurlantzick, “Repression and Revolt in China’s Wild West,” Current History, Vol. 103, No. 674 
(September 2004), p. 264. 
42 Kurlantzick, “China’s Dubious Role in the War on Terror,” p. 437. 
43 Niklas Swanstrom, “China and Xinjiang after September 11,” NIAS, No. 3 (2002), p. 14. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Bhattacharya, “Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” pp. 370-371. 
46 Kurlantzick, “Repression and Revolt in China’s Wild West,” p. 264. 
47 Ibid., pp. 264-265. 
48 Michael Clarke, “China’s Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia: Securing a “Silk Road” to Great 
Power Status?,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2008), p. 101. 
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minority community and uses the political and economic power that it has to maintain or 
strengthen its position.49 This will definitely create dissatisfaction and resentment among 
the minority community due to “the perception of discrepancy between the standard of 
value expectation and standard of value capabilities of any individual or community”.50 
This statement is parallel with Karl Marx’s hypothesis which suggested that as long as 
there is a gap between what the workers think they should have and what they really 
have, they will rise and rebel until the particular gap is minimized or diminished.51
Aberle has defined RD as “a negative discrepancy between legitimate 
expectations and actuality”.
 
52 Gurr on the other hand, has defined RD as “actors’ 
perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value 
capabilities”.53 ‘Value expectation’ here refers to things and living conditions that a 
person believes he has a right to own, while ‘value capabilities’ refers to things and living 
condition that a person can and has the ability to own or maintain.54
According to the theory of RD, the main factor that leads to the dissatisfaction of 
the minority community is not because of the problem of poverty, but it is in fact caused 
by the comparison made by an individual or even a group of individuals with their 
reference groups. The feeling of RD that exists within an individual is also known as 
‘personal deprivation’ which normally only has effects on a few individuals in anytime.
 
55 
For example, the feeling of RD occurred when an individual failed to get the promotion 
that he has been expected’. On the other hand, the feeling of RD among a group of 
individuals appears in situations such as suppression by ruling political party or when 
their status has been relatively lowered compared to the status of their reference group.56
                                                             
49 Abdul Rashid Moten and Syed Serajul Islam, Introduction to Political Science (Kuala Lumpur: 
Thompson Learning, 2005), p. 383. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 David F. Aberle, “A Note on Relative Deprivation Theory,” in Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., Millennial Dreams 
in Action: Essays in Comparative Study (The Hague: Mouton, 1962), p. 209. 
53 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1970), p. 24. 
54 Ibid., p 27. 
55 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 29.  
56 Ibid. 
 
Most importantly, the feeling of RD that exists among a group of individuals has the 
potential to cause collective violence when a group of people have the same 
dissatisfaction about the same thing. 
 This theory of RD is applicable and can best explain Beijing’s policy failure in the 
case of Xinjiang. In order to restore peace and stability in Xinjiang, Beijing has taken 
both persuasive and coercive policies in the region since the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949. However, minority disturbances in Xinjiang 
continue to occur and have become more serious. This essay will offer a few interesting 
explanations about factors that might lead to the failure of Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang 
based on the theory of RD. 
The level of RD among the Uighurs in Xinjiang will also determine the 
effectiveness of China’s policy in Xinjiang. The higher the level of RD among the 
Uighurs will lead to the failure of Beijing’s Xinjiang policy and vice-versa.  
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Figure 1: The Level of RD and the Effectiveness of PRC’s Policy in Xinjiang 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in figure 1 above, the level of RD among the Uighurs in Xinjiang is 
low if there is a reduction of incidents such as demonstrations, riots and small scale 
attacks in the region. The level of RD gets even lower when peace and stability started to 
exist in Xinjiang where the Uighurs can live in harmony with the Hans in the region. At 
this level, Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang can be considered as effective in achieving its 
goals in restoring peace and stability in its western region. The level of RD is at its lowest 
point when the minorities in Xinjiang including the Uighurs accept the concept of a 
Chinese nation state and refer themselves as a Chinese instead of their unique identity as 
a minority. This means that Beijing’s Xinjiang policy has been very successful where it 
has successfully integrated Xinjiang into a state dominated by Han and gave rise to a new 
united multi-ethnic China where national unity plays an important role.  
 The middle point of this feeling of RD among the Uighurs in Xinjiang is when 
both Uighurs and the Chinese government agree to negotiate with each other for mutual 
benefits. This is made the middle point because the success of the negotiation has the 
potential to improve the situation in Xinjiang by reducing the level of RD, while the 
failure of the negotiation will make things worse by increasing the level of RD among the 
Uighurs if inappropriate policies continue to be practiced by Beijing in Xinjiang. 
The success of PRC’s policy in Xinjiang 
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 The failure of Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang can be seen in the upper half of the 
figure. The level of RD reaches a high but not-so-serious level when the Uighurs show 
their dissatisfaction to the Chinese government through demonstrations and riots. The 
next level shows that the feeling of RD among the Uighurs in Xinjiang has risen to a 
serious level when they started to use violence means in expressing their dissatisfaction 
through small scale attacks, especially on the Hans and government’s properties that will 
sometime cause fatality. Next, the level of RD rises to a very serious level with the 
occurrence of ethnic conflict between the Uighurs and the Hans in the region. Ethnic 
conflict reflects extremely high Uighurs dissatisfaction towards the Chinese government 
which is dominated by Han Chinese. The level of RD is at its highest point when the 
Uighurs express their anger to the Chinese government through organized separatist 
movements and terrorism. At this level, Uighurs dissatisfaction to the Chinese 
government reaches its maximum point where Uighurs and Hans no longer can live 
together in harmony where the Uighurs have chosen to separate themselves from the rest 
of China by forming their own state. 
 Thus, one can notice that Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang has been ineffective since 
PRC was established in 1949 because there is never peace and stability in Xinjiang since 
that time. The situation in Xinjiang got worse along 1980s and 1990s with series of 
demonstrations and riots. For example, in December 1985, a demonstration by 2,000 non-
Han students has erupted in Urumqi against Beijing’s policy for nuclear testing in 
Xinjiang, Han mass immigration into Xinjiang and Beijing’s plan to extend its family 
planning policy to include the minorities in Xinjiang.57 Such demonstration and riot 
continue to exist into 1990s. For instance, the Baren Incident that happened in April 1990 
and Yining Incident in February 1997 that happened due to the Chinese government 
prohibition of Uighur social organization known as mashrap.58
 The complete failure of Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang can be seen in 2009 when 
ethnic conflict erupted between the Uighurs and the Hans in Urumqi. While there are also 
increasing problem of organized separatist movements and terrorism in Xinjiang, the 
2009 ethnic conflict in Urumqi has caused over 197 deaths and 1,700 injuries among the 
civilians besides 331 and 1325 damaged shop lots and vehicles respectively.
 
59 The 
magnitude and the use of violence in this conflict have also increased significantly 
compared to the past. Along 1990s, ‘terrorist’ activities in Xinjiang had only caused the 
total of 162 deaths and 440 injuries among the innocent civilians through small scale 
attacks.60
                                                             
57 Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, p. 8. 
58 Ibid., p. 17. 
 All these events show the highest Uighurs’ dissatisfaction to the Chinese 
government since the establishment of PRC in 1949. 
 
 
Factors Contributed to the Feeling of RD among Xinjiang Uighurs 
 
Table 2: Factors that lead to the failure of Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang 
59 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Negara Brunei Darussalam, July 18, 2009, 
http://www.bn.china-embassy.org/eng/zgxw/t573946.htm. 
60 Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, p. 12. 
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• Uighurs’ instinct to preserve their 
identity and PRC’s insensitivity 
towards local Muslim sentiments. 
 
• Mass influx of Han Chinese into 
Xinjiang. 
 
• Xinjiang’s increasing exposure to the 
Islamic world 
 
Failure of 
Beijing’s 
policy in 
Xinjiang. 
The role of 
foreign 
actors and 
Uighur 
diasporas 
abroad. 
 
 
Historical Memory  
Xinjiang had long been included in the Chinese maps, but it was not until the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) that the Chinese took serious steps towards Xinjiang’s 
integration into the Chinese soil.61
 
In the memory of the Uighurs, Xinjiang was a part of 
Central Asia and was the homeland for various branches of Turkic people such as the 
Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tatars, Uzbeks and the Uighurs themselves. In the 19th century under 
the influence of Pan-Turkism, Xinjiang has adopted the Pan-Turkic ideal to unite all the 
people of Turkish origin where the Uighurs were regarded as one of the branches of the 
Turkic tree.62
The region’s first demand for independence can be traced to an uprising by a local 
Khokandi militarist named Yakub Beg in 1865, who has established an independent 
Kashgar emirate in southern Xinjiang, extending his rule as far as Turfan that lasted until 
his death in 1877.
  
 
63
                                                             
61 Matthew Moneyhon, “Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier”,” Asia-Pacific Law 
and Policy Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 2002), p. 125. 
62 Bhattacharya, “Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” p. 361. 
63 Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, p. 3. 
 Even though the Qing Empire succeeded in reconquering most of 
Xinjiang in late 1870s, Yaqub Beg’s 12-year reign has set the precedent for Uighur 
independent movements based on religion and ethnicity. Besides, the incident has also 
exposed China weakness in its hold on Xinjiang and is still celebrated by the Uighurs 
today as a rallying point for Uighur nationalism. In November 18, 1884, the Qing Empire 
has formally annexed the East Turkestan region into its territory and has renamed the 
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region as Xinjiang, which means ‘new territory’ or ‘new frontier’.64
In addition, the Uighurs had twice formed their own state. The first was the East 
Turkestan Republic which was established in Kashgar in November 1933 and lasted till 
February 1934.
 For the Uighurs, the 
name ‘Xinjiang’ itself implies that the region did not belong to China from historical 
times like what the Chinese government claims.  
65 It was also known as the East Turkestan Islamic Republic in official 
materials and has become the milestone in Uighur nationalist history as well as a 
precedent cited by Uighur independence advocates today. In 1944, one of Xinjiang’s 
most influential Islamic leaders, Ali Han Tore has founded the second East Turkestan 
Republic in Ili region in northern Xinjiang.66 The republic was to a degree controlled by 
the Soviet Union and lasted until 1949 when Chinese Communist forces occupied 
Xinjiang with little resistance.67
Although Xinjiang has been given the status as an autonomous region in 1955 by 
Mao Zedong, but the Uighurs in reality have no actual rights to exercise self-rule in their 
land and this situation has provoked and exacerbated Uighur discontent towards the 
Chinese government. When the Uighurs in Xinjiang started to compare themselves to the 
Han Chinese that dominate the country, they soon realized that though top positions in 
local administration are occupied by the members of minority community, but the 
Uighurs are underrepresented at all levels in CCP, which is the center of real power in 
China.
  
68 For instance, Uighur leaders do not hold any place in the top central leadership 
position of the CCP and the region’s Party First Secretary is always a Han.69
Xinjiang is located on the famous Silk Road, where Uighurs played an important role in 
cultural exchanges between the East and the West. As a result, the Uighurs have 
eventually developed a unique culture and identity of their own. However, the most 
important marker for Uighurs’ identity is Islam. In the 8
 These 
political deprivations have led to the feeling of RD among the Uighurs and thus fuelled 
enormous dissent among them and caused Beijing’s policy failure in the region. 
 
 
Uighurs’ Identity and PRC’s Insensitivity Towards Local Muslim Sentiments 
th century, the Arab armies had 
swept into Central Asia and spread the new faith of Islam.70 Islam is not merely just a 
religion for Uighurs in Xinjiang, but it is also a tool to preserve Uighurs’ historical 
traditions and cultures. This is because Uighurs in Xinjiang also referred themselves as 
part of the ummah (world Islamic community), where they have linked their identity to 
the wider Muslim community through regular prayers, reading the Quran and adopting 
Islamic food habits and symbols.71
                                                             
64 Bhattacharya, “Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” p. 360. 
65 Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, p. 5. 
66 Moneyhon, “Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier”,” p. 126. 
67 Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, p. 5. 
 Therefore, one can say that Islamic heritage, Turkic 
language and Uighurs’ strong ethnic and cultural ties with the Central Asians have 
contributed to the formation of a unique Uighur identity.  
68 Sanjeev Kumar, “The Roots of China’s Xinjiang Problem,” July 18, 2009, http://www.icwa.in/Ibdoc/IB-
xinjiang.pdf. p. 6. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Bhattacharya, “Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” p. 361. 
71 Ibid. 
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However, Han culture still dominates and has the tendency to overwhelm the 
identity and cultures of the minorities in many aspects of life in China. In the case of 
Xinjiang, Uighur language has been slowly replaced by Mandarin where minority 
languages were said to be irrelevant for a modern Chinese state. Indeed, Uighurs 
religious belief and activities were also strictly controlled and monitored by the Chinese 
authorities. All these, have caused the feeling of RD among the Uighurs, especially when 
they compare themselves with their cousins in Central Asia and other Muslim community 
in China that relatively have more cultural and religious freedom than them.  
In 1990-1991, Uighurs in Xinjiang had witnessed the collapse of Soviet Union 
and how their cousins in Central Asia had established five new independent Central 
Asian republics. The feeling of RD emerged among the Uighurs in Xinjiang when they 
compare themselves to the population in Central Asia who now has their own state. In 
addition, unlike the Uighurs who enjoy only limited religious and cultural freedom in 
Xinjiang, the Central Asians on the other hand have wider freedom in terms of their 
beliefs, cultures and tradition. All these had no doubt led to the feeling of RD among the 
Uighurs and further encouraged separatism among the Uighurs in their quest for 
independence.  
 The Chinese government must also be more sensitive in matters regarding the 
Uighurs and Islam. Beijing has to realize that Islam itself is inseparable with the identity 
of Uighurs as a Muslim minority group in China. Thus, when Beijing started to impose a 
strict religious and cultural policy in Xinjiang, Islam in that region has slowly become 
more and more political and has also become a rallying point for Uighurs’ desire.72 As a 
result, one can notice that many Uighur demonstrations and riots occurred in Xinjiang 
were caused by issues related to Islam. One good example of these is the Talip incident in 
Yarkand that occurred on January 5, 1990 where the Chinese authorities have closed 
down private religious schools (madrasahs) in the area and return the students (talips) to 
their home districts due to the tremendous increment in the number of madrasah and 
talip.73 As a result, hundreds of talips have demonstrated in Yarkand shouting slogans 
such as ‘study and protect Islam’ and ‘down with the kafirs’.74
The Chinese government must also understand that its strict religious and cultural 
policy imposed on the Uighurs in Xinjiang will lead to the feeling of RD among the 
Uighurs. Besides the Central Asians, other Muslim groups in China had also become the 
reference group for the Uighurs in Xinjiang. While Beijing has loosened its control over 
the religion of the Dai in Yunnan and Hui (Han Muslims) in north and southwest of 
China, the same cannot be said for Xinjiang.
 
75
                                                             
72 Lilian Craig Harris, “Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China’s Policy in the Islamic 
World,” The China Quarterly, No. 133 (March 1993), p. 120. 
73 Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, p. 14. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang,” p. 32. 
 Since all three groups shared the same 
identity as Muslim groups in a Socialist Chinese state, Uighurs in Xinjiang will tend to 
think that they too deserve the same treatment as the Dai and Hui by the Chinese 
government. This will also lead to the feeling of RD among the Uighurs when they 
compare themselves with the Dai and Hui and realized that these two groups relatively 
have more religious and cultural freedom than them.  
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The Influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang 
The influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang is the most important factor that leads to 
the feeling of RD among the Uighurs. Han mass migration into Xinjiang has become an 
important component in Beijing’s Xinjiang policy since the establishment of PRC in 
1949. This is because PRC’s policy of Han migration to Xinjiang has the ability to 
change the demography in the region by turning the majority Uighur population into a 
minority group in Xinjiang itself in order for Beijing to maintain strong control over the 
region concerned.76 The Chinese government also believes that ethnic minority 
discontent would disappear if the problem of poverty and huge income disparities could 
be remedied.77
 It is undeniable that Beijing’s policy to bring in the Han Chinese into Xinjiang for 
the purpose of economic development has brought several benefits for the indigenous 
people, especially for those who can speak fluent Mandarin. But Hans in Xinjiang are 
easier to get jobs, have better living conditions and will sometimes use their superior 
status to suppress the Uighurs.
 Therefore, in June 1999, Beijing has announced an ambitious plan to 
develop China’s western frontiers known as the ‘Go West’ policy or xibu da kaifa. The 
policy calls for massive infrastructure projects such as rail roads and dams building, as 
well as highway construction had of course has facilitated more Han migration into 
Xinjiang in search of economic opportunities. Beijing’s decision to develop its western 
regions however, has not only created further discontent among the Uighurs in Xinjiang, 
but has also led to the emergence of feeling of RD among them when they compare 
themselves with their Han counterparts who relatively have higher living standard than 
them.  
78
                                                             
76 Bhattacharya, “Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” p. 366. 
77 June Teufel Dreyer, “China’s Vulnerability to Minority Separatism,” Asian Affairs: An American 
Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Summer 2005), p. 75. 
78 Kurlantzick, “Repression and Revolt in China’s Wild West,” p. 263. 
 Thus, Uighurs who are skeptical of Beijing intentions 
and motives behind the plan believed that the real objectives of the “Go West’ policy 
were to integrate Xinjiang’s policy more firmly with the rest of China, facilitate more 
Han migration into the region and thus enhance Beijing’s control over the region. This is 
because although China’s plan to develop Xinjiang has also increased the per capita 
income for the people in Xinjiang and enhanced their living standards tremendously, but 
the disparities in the wealth retribution between the Uighurs and the Hans continue to 
exist, or perhaps has even widened.  
 The widening of wealth gap between the Uighurs and the Hans is resulted by the 
economic priorities set by Beijing in Xinjiang that can be best described as ‘one white, 
one black’, which refer to the production of cotton and oil. Xinjiang is the largest cotton 
producer in China but PRC’s subsidies for the cotton production sector is only profitable 
for large mechanized PCC farms dominated by the Hans and leave small-scale Uighurs 
farmers worse off. Even for the oil industry, the Uighurs have been excluded from the 
industry in Xinjiang where the workforce is overwhelmingly Han. Many Uighurs also 
feel that Xinjiang’s oil and other petroleum products are their wealth, but these products 
have been exploited by Beijing for energy needs all over China with only little 
compensation to the people in Xinjiang. This economic deprivation has then led to the 
feeling of RD among the Uighurs and fuelled their dissatisfaction towards the Chinese 
government. 
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It is difficult for us to measure the wealth gap between the Uighurs and the Hans 
to prove that the Uighurs have fallen behind the Hans economically in Xinjiang. 
However, the situation can be reflected through the strong coincidence of high incomes 
with high concentration of Hans in Xinjiang, as well as low incomes with Uighur 
predominance in the region.79 Beijing’s policy to bring in the Hans into Xinjiang to 
develop the area is an inappropriate approach. The policy not only failed to reduced 
separatism sentiment and ethnic confrontation in the region, in fact, it has increased 
tension between the Uighurs and Han Chinese in the region. This is parallel with Roskin 
et al in their explanation about RD that says: “the poor seldom revolt; they are too busy 
feeding their families. But once people have a full belly they start looking around and 
notice that some people are living much better than [them]”.80
In the early stage of Deng’s leadership, Muslims in China were encouraged to 
preserve their identity and were given freedom to practice their beliefs. For instance, in 
1980, the Xinjiang Islamic Association was permitted to re-introduced Arabic scripts in 
Uighur and Kazakh languages.
 Even though Beijing’s 
plan to develop its western regions has increased the per capita income and living 
standard of the Uighurs, but the Hans that have migrated to Xinjiang obviously have 
higher living standard where they dominated most of the top positions in the government, 
have advantages in getting jobs with higher pay. These Hans also dominated trade and 
business in major cities in Xinjiang such as Urumqi and live a more luxurious life 
compared to the Uighurs. 
 
 
Xinjiang’s Increasing Exposure to the Islamic World 
Xinjiang’s increasing exposure to the Islamic world is also one of the factors that 
will contribute to the feeling of RD among the Uighurs in Xinjiang and thus, influences 
the effectiveness of Beijing’s Xinjiang policy. Xinjiang’s exposure to the Islamic world, 
particularly the Central Asian republics has increased drastically when Deng Xiaoping 
took over the ruling power of CCP in 1978 by taking a more liberal and tolerant religious 
and cultural policy towards the minorities.  
81 Deng administration also re-allowed Muslims in China, 
including Xinjiang Muslims to undertake the hajj in Mecca. Development in Xinjiang in 
the 1980s has further accelerated Xinjiang exposure to the Islamic world through 
significant transportation and administrative infrastructure building. Rapid construction 
of roads, railroads and cities have helped to facilitate the flow of goods, services and 
ideas from the Central Asian republics and Pakistan into Xinjiang where many Chinese 
Muslims have started to travel on business to these countries.82 This exposure has 
enabled Xinjiang Muslims to gain foreign funds, especially from countries like Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Iran to improve their conditions. These funds have been used to build 
mosques, theological schools and import religious materials such as the Quran.83
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The Chinese government during that period of time has also chosen to open up 
Xinjiang’s border to Central Asian republics for economic purposes. However, Deng’s 
tolerant policy has its own pros and cons. One must agree that by opening Xinjiang’s 
border to Central Asia for economic purposes, economic development in Xinjiang can be 
achieved more quickly through unlimited movement of labor, capital and goods which 
are important for economic development in Xinjiang. However, the policy that allowed 
greater religious expression for Muslims in China has also increased Xinjiang’s contact 
with the Islamic world and brought in the problem of domestic instability to Xinjiang 
through the inflow of ‘wrong’ ideas, weapons, belief and religion practices from Central 
Asia, as well as literatures about pre-1949 Xinjiang history.84
The feeling of RD among the Uighurs in Xinjiang emerged when they notice that 
the Muslim population in other parts of the world has even more religious freedom than 
them. This situation eventually whetted Uighurs’ appetites for greater religious freedom 
at home. The Chinese government realized the significance of this phenomenon and 
started to change its liberal religious policy into a new religious policy with new 
restrictions. Since then, the government has forbid meetings between Muslim clerics and 
foreigners, as well as the teaching of Uighur history and doctrine of Jihad (holy war).
  
85 
Arab teachers from the Middle East were not allowed to work in theological schools in 
Xinjiang which was established through funding from Saudi Arabia and only applicants 
aged 50 and above were allowed to undertake the Hajj in Mecca.86 Last but not least, no 
Chinese citizens were given permission by the Chinese government to study in either Iran 
or Pakistan.87
The Uighur diaspora in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have established formal 
political organizations in the two countries concerned after they have achieved their 
independence.
 However, Uighurs’ thirst for greater religious freedom at home cannot be 
reversed and this is one of the factors that have contributed to the failure of Beijing’s 
policy in Xinjiang. 
 
 
The Role of External Actors and Uighur Diasporas Abroad 
88 These organizations distributed various books, magazines and cassettes 
into Xinjiang and sought international attention for Uighur independence movement in 
Xinjiang.89
 Beijing’s suppression on its minorities in Xinjiang, particularly the Uighurs has 
whetted the desire of Uighur diaspora in other parts of the world to offer financial and 
moral support to Uighurs’ struggle in Xinjiang. For instance, there are some wealthy 
Uighurs living in Saudi Arabia that have provided support and funds to advocate 
 They represent the Uighurs to promote and lobby for the rights and interests 
of the Uighurs in Xinjiang on world stage to gain international attention on Beijing’s 
suppression on its minorities and Uighur quest for independence from China. 
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independence and political Islam in Xinjiang.90 ETIM is one of the major beneficiaries of 
these encouraging supports from Uighur diaspora abroad besides other Uighur 
organizations such as the World Uighur Youth Congress and East Turkestan National 
Congress.91 This source of funding from Uighur diaspora abroad has become more 
critical with the release of an Uighur activist and businesswoman, Rebiya Kadeer from 
detention in China on 14 March 2005 on charges of providing state secrets abroad.92
The Uighur diaspora abroad are also becoming more and more active and 
organized in their activities to fight for the rights and the welfare of Uighurs in Xinjiang. 
There have been contacts between Uighur diaspora with diaspora of other dissident ethnic 
groups. For example, as early as in 1986, exiled leaders from Xinjiang, Mongolia and 
Tibet had joined forces to publish a journal entitled ‘Common Voice: Journal of the 
Allied Committee of the People of Eastern Turkistan, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Tibet 
Presently Under China’.
  
93 Today, they are using the internet to expand their reach to the 
audience and gain more attention from people all around the world. Furthermore, in 2004, 
the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) was established, unifying two leading Uighur exile 
groups. The son of former leader of Xinjiang pre-1949 government, Erkin Alptekin was 
elected as the organization’s first president.94
The main reason for the failure of Beijing’s Xinjiang policy, which aimed to 
restore peace and stability in the region by eliminating or reducing the separatist 
tendencies among the Uighurs and ethnic confrontation between the Uighurs and the 
Hans is not the problem of poverty focused in Beijing’s Xinjiang policy, but is the feeling 
of RD that exists among the Uighurs in Xinjiang. This feeling of RD emerged when the 
Uighurs compared themselves with their reference groups such as the Hans, the Central 
 The organization hoped that Alptekin 
popularity in international arena will help WUC to promote Uighur cause internationally. 
Last but not least, the new generation of western-educated Uighur diaspora abroad today 
also started to use slogans related to the concepts democracy and free election in 
Xinjiang, which are more appealing to the western audience. 
It is true that the efforts of Uighur diaspora all over the world have brought 
increasingly international attention to the issues of independence and freedom of the 
Uighurs in Xinjiang. In fact, these Uighur diaspora abroad had also played an important 
role in further fuelled the separatist movements by the Uighurs in Xinjiang through their 
support and funds. However, these diaspora organizations have only little impact on 
Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang. Their efforts to influence Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang still 
needs help of external actors such as Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) and foreign 
governments to pressure Beijing on its suppression to its minorities in Xinjiang. 
However, these external actors often have their own agenda and interests regarding their 
relations with Beijing, which are usually against the interests of Uighur diaspora. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Asians as well as other Muslim community in China. Among a few factors that have 
contributed to the feeling of RD among the Uighurs in Xinjiang include Uighurs’ 
historical memory, their instinct to preserve their identity and Beijing insensitivity 
towards Xinjiang’s Muslim sentiment, the influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang, as well as 
Xinjiang’s increasing exposure to the Islamic world.  
            Among all these factors, the influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang is the most 
important factor that leads to the failure of Beijing policy in Xinjiang. Beijing’s decision 
to bring in huge number of Han Chinese into Xinjiang for the economic development in 
the region has created a gap in Uighurs’ perceptions about what they think they should be 
able to achieve and what they can really achieve when they compare themselves with 
their Han counterparts in their everyday lives. This is because although China’s plan to 
develop Xinjiang has been successful in increasing Uighurs income per capita and 
enhancing their living standards, but the Uighurs in Xinjiang still fallen behind the Han 
Chinese who migrated into the region in many aspects of their lives. This feeling of RD 
combined with Uighurs’ resentment and dissatisfaction to the Chinese government had 
resulted in Beijing policy failure in Xinjiang since PRC’s establishment in 1949.  
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